We decompose the correlation of bank stock returns into a systemic risk compon- it is important to distinguish between the two sources of interbank correlations when quantifying systemic risk at banks. Our decomposition also permits us to estimate the marginal gains from diversi…cation, which turn out to be rapidly declining with bank size. Since large banks are additionally found to display high levels of the systemic risk component, they are hence predominantly exposed to the undesirable source of interbank correlation.
Introduction
The recent crisis has made systemic risk a priority on the agenda of policy makers. While such risk arises from a variety of sources, a common consequence is that it increases the vulnerability of the …nancial system to shocks. Broadly, two di¤erent channels can be distinguished. First, since …nancial institutions are heavily interconnected, a shock to one part of the …nancial system can easily spill over to other parts. 1 Second, …nancial institutions tend to undertake similar activities, or display homogeneity in other dimensions (such as their risk management systems), which may amplify the impact of common shocks. 2 Notably, both channels are particularly pronounced at large banks as these banks are highly connected and also tend to be a direct source of common shocks.
In order to avoid a repeat of the crisis, regulators are now redesigning …nancial regulation to address systemic risk. 3 A major challenge for this is the measurement of systemic risk. Since systemic risk can arise in many di¤erent ways, a popular approach is to focus on an institution's overall systemic risk, as re ‡ected in market prices. We argue that one has to be careful in equating interbank correlations with systemic risk. The reason for this is diversi…cation activities at banks. To see the issue, suppose that all banks in the economy are fully diversi…ed and hence invest in the same portfolio (the market portfolio). Interbank correlations will then obviously be one -but this is neither due to the presence of spillovers among banks nor to any banking sector-speci…c homogeneity. This simple example illustrates a bigger issue: interbank correlations are partly driven by the diversi…cation characteristics of banks.
We propose a methodology that allows us to isolate the part of the interbank correlation that is not due to diversi…cation. The method is based on the concept of minimum commonality. The minimum commonality is the degree of commonality at banks that is unavoidable given their degree of diversi…cation. From this one can de…ne a bank's excess correlation (the systemic part of interbank correlation) as the part of a bank's interbank correlation that exceeds the one implied by its minimum commonality.
The decomposition of interbank correlation is not only important conceptually but also from a regulatory perspective. As the components arise for very di¤erent reasons, they are expected to have di¤erent implications for …nancial stability. Portfolio theory suggests that diversi…cation enhances banks'resilience to shocks. Consistent with this, subsequent Basel accords have permitted a capital relief for diversi…ed portfolios. As a consequence, there is not necessarily a reason for regulators to be concerned about high interbank correlations if those are mainly due to diversi…cation. By contrast, excess correlation indicates the presence of spillovers and homogeneity in the …nancial system not found in other sectors of the economy. It should hence be of prime concern for regulators.
We apply our methodology to U.S. BHCs. The results strengthen the view that it is important to distinguish between the di¤erent sources of bank correlations. First, we …nd that a large part of the (cross-sectional) variation in interbank correlations is due to diversi…cation: about 84% of a bank's average correlation with other banks can be explained by its minimum commonality. The systemic component in interbank correlations is hence of only lesser importance. Second, the two components had di¤er-ent implications for the resilience of banks during the crisis of [2007] [2008] [2009] . While banks with a higher minimum commonality (indicating more diversi…cation) performed better during the crisis, banks with more systemic correlation did not systematically perform di¤erently than other banks. 5 Third, the distinction between both correlation components matters especially for large banks, which are of special importance for …nancial stability. These banks display very high excess correlation are hence subject to a large amount of systemic risk.
While the primary focus of this paper is the decomposition of interbank correlation, a second aim is the development of a market-based measure of diversi…cation.
Prior literature on diversi…cation at …rms (…nancial or non-…nancial) had to deal with the challenge that it is not easy to quantify a …rm's overall diversi…cation since diversi…cation can arise from a variety of di¤erent sources. 6 In addition, construction of comprehensive diversi…cation measures is often constrained by the fact that accounting data only provides very limited information on diversi…cation activities.
Our diversi…cation measure is computed from the commonality of a …rm with the market portfolio. It is based on the idea that the more diversi…ed a …rm is, the closer it becomes to the market portfolio and the higher should be its correlation with the latter. 7 The advantage of this measure is that it captures overall diversi…cation and hence encompasses a variety of sources of diversi…cation. It is also an easily computable measure as the only (…rm-speci…c) input is the …rms'stock price.
The diversi…cation measures computed for BHCs exhibit some interesting properties.
Among others, they suggest quickly declining bene…ts from diversi…cation. While at small banks increases in size are associated with substantial increases in diversi…cation, these gains are quickly eroded. For medium-size and large banks, increases in size only lead to modest improvements in diversi…cation. Taken together with the result that large banks display a high degree of excess correlation, this suggests that these banks have a high amount of the undesirable part of correlation, but only bene…t to a lesser extent from the desirable part.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related 5 The latter result may re ‡ect various forms of government bailouts. 6 Besides asset-side diversi…cation (such as through geographical or functional diversi…cation), diversi…cation also arises on the liability side. For example, using di¤erent sources of funding (e.g., market-funding and bank loans) reduces exposure to funding shocks. At banks the measurement of diversi…cation is particularly complex since banks undertake a plethora of diversifying activities, many of them also o¤-balance sheet (for instance, securitization and the buying and selling of credit protection). 7 While we use correlations of market returns, an alternative is balance-sheet based correlation measures (for instance, the correlation of a …rm's pro…ts or sales with those in the economy).
literature. Section 3 explains our methodology for separating interbank correlation into a diversi…cation and a systemic part. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes.
Related Literature
The measurement of systemic risk has advanced rapidly in recent years. An important strand of the literature quanti…es systemic risk using information contained in the market prices of …nancial institutions. These measures, directly or indirectly, use interbank correlations as an input. While early work has quanti…ed systemic risk directly through interbank correlations (e.g., De Nicolò and Kwast (2002)), recent contributions have re…ned measurement by looking at modi…cations of interbank correlations or covariates.
The CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010)), for instance, estimates the covariance of a bank and the banking sector conditional on the bank experiencing a tail event. Acharya et al. (2011) propose to measure systemic risk through the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), which is the expected loss to a …nancial institution conditional on a set of banks performing poorly. Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009) combine default probabilities from CDS with stock return correlations to calculate a Distressed Insurance Premium (DIP), which is the insurance premium required to cover distressed losses in the banking system. In a recent paper, Billio et al. (2012) characterize systemic risk by measuring correlation through principal components analysis. The results in our paper suggest that one has to be careful with interpreting these (and other) systemic risk measures since the correlations that underlie them may partly be driven by diversi…cation activities. In order to arrive at a "pure"measure of systemic risk, the measures should be alternatively computed, isolating the e¤ect of diversi…cation. Our approach provides a methodology for how this can be done. 8 The second interest of our paper relates to extant work on the relationship between diversi…cation and …rm valuation and performance. The evidence pertaining to …nancial 8 Applying our methodology to these systemic risk measures is relatively straightforward since in its empirical implementation it amounts to including only the part of interbank correlations that is orthogonal to the correlation with the market. institutions is mixed. 9 Owing to data constraints, many papers focus on functional diversi…cation, measured by the share of non-interest rate activities at banks. Our study di¤ers in two respects from prior work. First, we employ a new measure of diversi…cation. As a market-based measure it captures overall diversi…cation of a bank, including all potential on-balance sheet and o¤-balance sheet diversi…cation activities.
It also measures e¤ective diversi…cation in that it takes into account any correlation among activities which accounting-based measures will ignore. Second, we do not focus on bank performance in normal times, but in times of crisis. Speci…cally, controlling for a variety of alternative factors, we …nd that diversi…cation reduces a bank's vulnerability to the crisis of 2007-2009, consistent with portfolio theory. 10 Together with some 9 The literature on non-…nancials mostly arrives at a negative link between diversi…cation and …rm performance (Lang and Stulz (1994) , Berger and Ofek (1995) and Servaes (1996) ); however it also identi…es various methodological hurdles (see Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) , Campa and Kedia (2002) , Graham et al. (2002) ). 10 Brunnermeier, Dong and Palia (2012) examine the non-interest income at banks. In contrast to our study they …nd that a higher share of such income (a proxy for functional diversi…cation) is negatively related to performance during the crisis of 2007-2009. evidence that diversi…cation is e¢ ciency-reducing in normal times, this may suggest that diversi…cation bene…ts mainly materialize in downturns. This is consistent with the notion that diversi…cation trades o¤ loss of specialization with lower exposure to shocks. 11 
Methodology
In this section we describe how interbank correlation can be decomposed into a diver- Let us now analyze arbitrary portfolio choices w A and w B . We …rst de…ne a concept of commonality and diversi…cation.
De…nition 1
The degree of commonality between banks A and B is given by
Similar to interbank correlation, the degree of commonality will be zero where banks specialize in di¤erent assets (e.g., w A = 1 and w B = 0) and one if banks hold identical
De…nition 2 The degree of diversi…cation at bank i (i 2 fA; Bg) is given by
The degree of diversi…cation will be zero if the bank is undiversi…ed (w i = 0 or w i = 1) and one if the bank is fully diversi…ed (w i =
2
).
Commonality can be decomposed as follows. We …rst calculate the commonality that is unavoidable to reach a degree of diversi…cation identical to that of the banking sector, which we call minimum commonality. For average banking sector diversi…cation
), minimum commonality is de…ned as follows:
is the lowest commonality s that can implement banking sector diversi…cation d. Formally we have:
From this we can de…ne excess commonality:
De…nition 4 Excess commonality e(w A ; w B ) is the di¤erence between actual and minimum commonality:
In our simple example, excess commonality can be easily computed. For a given diversi…cation, the smallest commonality obtains when banks specialize as much as possible in di¤erent assets. For average banking sector diversi…cation
), it is easy to see that an allocation that minimizes commonality arises when bank A invests a fraction ). 12 The resulting commonality is then s
Since the portfolio shares enter linearly into the commonality measure, there are many other portfolios that lead to the same minimum commonality.
d. Thus, the minimum commonality required to achieve a certain level of diversi…cation is given by the degree of diversi…cation itself. It follows that Proposition 1 In the two-bank two-asset economy, excess commonality e(w A ; w B ) is given by the di¤erence between actual commonality s(w A ; w B ) and diversi…cation d(w A ; w B ).
In an empirical implementation we face various challenges. First, we do not have information on the bank portfolio shares w i that are needed for calculating commonality.
However, one can approximate commonality using the correlation of bank stock returns across banks. In particular, the share price correlation of two banks with zero commonality should be zero, while for banks with maximum commonality the correlation should be one. Observing that diversi…cation is e¤ectively a measure of commonality with the market portfolio, we can in addition approximate diversi…cation by the correlation of a bank with the market portfolio. In particular, a (hypothetical) bank that is fully diversi…ed along all dimensions should have a correlation with the market portfolio of one.
Second, we have to adapt the commonality measures for more than two banks. If there are at least three banks, commonality becomes bank-speci…c. We can then calculate the commonality of an individual bank by its average correlation with all other banks, or, alternatively, by its correlation with a banking sector index.
Third, the simple property that excess correlation equals commonality minus diversi…cation (Proposition 1) only holds for the special case of uncorrelated assets and when the number of assets is at least as large as the number of banks. 13 In the general case, excess correlation will still be a negative function of the diversi…cation degree.
The exact functional form, however, will depend on what is assumed about the set of investable assets in the economy. In our empirical implementation we will hence estimate the excess correlation. For this we will take excess correlation to be the regression residual from a regression of interbank correlation on diversi…cation. This has the consequence that excess correlation becomes a relative concept (and can hence be negative) as it compares a bank's actual correlation to that which is predicted for its 13 If the number of assets is less than the number of banks, it is not possible for banks to all specialize in (pair-wise) di¤erent assets. As a result, the minimum commonality associated with a certain degree of diversi…cation rises, and excess correlation falls. Similarly, when assets are (positively) correlated, banks will be correlated even if they invest in di¤erent assets, again leading to lower excess correlation. diversi…cation degree. shows that some highly diversi…ed banks have very high interbank correlation. Figure   2 provides a closer look at this phenomenon by depicting only banks with interbank 14 Excluding the crisis period is warranted to avoid biases arising from calculating correlations in high volatility periods (see e.g. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 
Decomposition of Interbank Correlation
The next step is to separate interbank correlation into the part that comes from diversi…cation and from systemic (excess) correlation. The approach we take here is to treat systemic correlation as the part of the interbank correlation that cannot be explained by diversi…cation, and hence has to be the result of other bank characteristics that cause correlatedness. Speci…cally, we run the following cross-sectional regression 15 :
where i;b is the interbank correlation of bank i and i;m is the diversi…cation measure for bank i. A bank's systemic correlation is taken to be its predicted residual from this regression,^ i . Systemic correlation is hence the increased interbank correlation for bank i relative to that which is predicted by bank i 0 s market correlation. Note that systemic correlation can be negative -in which case a bank has a lower correlation relative to what is predicted for its diversi…cation measure using the entire sample of banks. The average interbank correlation is about 27% and ranges from -19% to 83%. The diversi…cation measure has a mean equal to 32%, with the lowest value being equal to -11% and a maximum of 69%. The mean of the systemic correlation (which is a regression residual) is zero. Systemic correlation varies between -18% and 33%. The two largest values are obtained for Bank of America and Wells Fargo & Co. 15 We have also …tted a non-linear relationship by including the square of the diversi…cation variable. This did not materially a¤ect our results.
Determinants of Bank Diversi…cation and Excess Correlation
In this section we examine how excess correlation and diversi…cation relate to various bank characteristics. For this purpose, we estimate the following cross-section model: Finally, we include various variables that capture credit risk transfer and derivative activities. Such activities are obvious candidates for determining bank level diversi…cation -but they may also be drivers of excess correlation since they tend to increase interconnectedness among banks. To proxy securitization activities, we consider mortgage-backed securities (M BS held to maturity=Assets) and total securitized assets (Securitization=Assets) both relative to assets. To capture derivative activities, we include total derivatives (consisting of commodity, foreign exchange, equity and interest rate derivatives) used for hedging over assets (Derivatives not f or trade=Assets).
17
We also include two variables measuring the use of credit derivatives: the gross position on credit derivatives over assets held by the banks (Gross position CD=Assets), which equals the sum of the protection bought and sold in the credit derivatives market, and the net position on credit derivatives over assets (N et position CD=Assets), which 16 Loan growth has been found to reduce lending quality (see Foos, Norden, and Weber (2010)). 17 Since a large part of bank derivative activities consists of trading activities that are unrelated to credit risk transfer, it is advisable to only include the part of derivatives that are related to hedging. equals the di¤erence between the protection bought and sold by the bank. The distinction between gross and net aims to capture the di¤erence between a pure transfer of credit risk (net-position) and the simultaneous buying and selling of risk (grossposition). These activities are expected to have di¤erent implications for diversi…cation and systemic risk (see Norden et. al, forthcoming).
Diversi…cation
We …rst analyze how the diversi…cation component, i;m , relates to various sets of bank characteristics. For this we initially investigate sets of control variables separately in order to reduce problems arising from multicollinearity. Table 2 presents the results.
Column (1) contains the estimation of the relationship between the diversi…cation measure and general bank characteristics. The share of loans is found to be negatively and signi…cantly related with diversi…cation. This result implies that a higher proportion of non-traditional activities at banks (non-loan business) is associated with more diversi…cation, consistent with previous literature that uses loan shares as an (inverse) proxy for functional diversi…cation (see e.g. Laeven and Levine (2007)). Size is positively and signi…cantly related to diversi…cation, while the squared size-term is negatively and signi…cantly related to diversi…cation. Taken together, this indicates an inverted U-shape relationship between diversi…cation and size. This interesting property of the data can also be directly appreciated from Figure 3 , which plots diversi…cation against size (proxied by the log of assets). The …gure shows that for smaller and medium-sized banks, increases in bank size are associated with substantial improvements in diversi…cation. However, for larger banks there is no strong increase in diversi…cation. This picture is consistent with marginal bene…ts from diversi…cation that are declining rapidly. In particular, it suggests that diversi…cation opportunities are already reasonably well reaped at medium-sized banks.
Column (2) focuses on the relationship between asset quality and diversi…cation.
Loan growth is found to be positively related to diversi…cation. Presumably, fast growing banks have to expand to new business areas, leading to higher diversi…cation. Pro…tability, measured by ROA, is also positively related to diversi…cation. This result is somewhat unexpected as one might have thought that there would be a trade-o¤ between diversi…cation and return. 18 It may be explained, however, if diversi…cation into non-traditional activities (such as to fee generating income) leads to higher returns.
Column (3) reports results for the model that includes securitization proxies. It shows a positive and signi…cant relation between securitized assets and diversi…cation. This is explained by the fact that securitization enables banks to improve diversi…cation by o¤-loading overrepresented exposures in their lending portfolios. 19 In column (4) we analyze the role of di¤erent derivatives activities. We …nd a positive and signi…cant relation for both the derivatives for hedging and the gross position held in credit derivatives. As with securitization, this result is consistent with the notion that credit risk transfer leads to more diversi…cation (Nijskens and Wagner (2011) , for example, show that credit derivative usage at banks reduces the volatility of their share prices). Notably, the net credit derivative position does not enter signi…cantly (while the gross position does), indicating that a pure shedding of risk does not contribute to diversi…cation.
We are also interested in studying how our market-based diversi…cation measure relates to other diversi…cation proxies. For this, we compare our measure with functional diversi…cation proxies (as constructed, for instance, in Laeven and Levine (2007)).
These proxies are either based on assets or revenues. Denoting with w L the share of loans to assets, asset diversi…cation is calculated as Asset Diversity = 1 j2w L 1j.
Similarly, for revenue diversity we have Revenue Diversity = 1 j2w R 1j, where w R is the share of non-interest income. In column (5) and (6) we include these proxies. As expected, both functional diversi…cation proxies are positively related to our diversi…cation measure.
The last column of Table 2 includes all variables jointly (except the alternative diversi…cation proxies). Three of the bank variables become insigni…cant (loan growth, derivatives for hedging and the gross position held in credit derivatives). In addition, interest income becomes negatively and signi…cantly related to diversi…cation (consistent 18 Consistent with such a trade-o¤, Stiroh and Rumble (2006) …nd a negative relationship between diversi…cation and pro…tability using accounting data. 19 Diversi…cation may also be improved because following a transfer of risk, banks take on new (and possibly less correlated) risks, see Franke and Krahnen (2005) and Loutskina and Strahan (2006) ).
with a diversi…cation-specialization trade-o¤), while the coe¢ cient of total securitization becomes negative and signi…cant.
Size is an important factor in explaining variations in diversi…cation. This can be appreciated by the fact that the R-squared in a model that only includes the two size terms is 0.56 (not reported), while the R-squared in the model that includes the full set of variables (column (7)) is only marginally higher (0.62). Table 3 presents the results for various models that relate excess correlation^ i to bank characteristics. Column (1) shows the results for general bank characteristics. Bank size is negative and signi…cant, while squared bank size relates positively to excess correlation. There is hence a U-shape relation between excess correlation and size. This relation also shows in Figure 4 , which plots excess correlation against size. Medium size banks thus have the lowest excess correlation, while small and large banks display relatively large excess correlation. The result for large banks is unsurprising. Large money center banks are systemic and hence are expected to display signi…cant comovement with the banking sector. The result for small banks is more surprising, but can be explained by the fact that small banks are very undiversi…ed (Figure 3) , hence their interbank correlation conditional on diversi…cation is expected to be high. High levels of correlation among small banks may also be the result of herding incentives arising from too-many-to-fail policies (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007) . Such incentives are expected to be more pronounced for small banks -since larger banks already enjoy bailout guarantees due to too-big-to fail policies. Column (2), which includes the asset quality proxies, shows that the share of interest income from loans is signi…cant and positively related to the excess correlation. This is surprising since one may have expected non-traditional activities to be perceived as more systemic by the market (and hence lending activities less). It is however consistent with the experience of the systemic crisis of 2007-2009, which was caused by common investments in subprime mortgages. Column (3), which considers securitization activities, shows that total securitization is positively related with excess correlation. This is expected since securitization activities tend to make banks more interconnected.
Excess Correlation
Column (4) presents the results for derivatives use. As in the diversi…cation case, only derivatives for hedging and the gross notional amount of credit derivatives have a positive and signi…cant relation with excess interbank correlation. This …nding is interesting and rea¢ rms the often expressed concern that …nancial innovation contributes to systemic risk in the …nancial sector. The potential for …nancial innovation to create system risk is especially apparent in the case of banks that build up gross-positions in derivatives, as these will result in banks being interlinked with each other through counterparty-risk without necessarily creating any bene…ts arising from a (net) shedding of risks out of the banking sector. 
Interbank Correlation and Bank Performance During the Crisis
Interbank correlation is a commonly used indicator for the extent of systemic risk in the banking sector. In this section we study its impact on bank performance during the subprime crisis, separating out the diversi…cation and the excess correlation component.
For this we relate banks'overall share price returns during the subprime crisis to their pre-crisis correlation measures, controlling for other bank characteristics. We expect more diversi…ed banks to be more resilient during the crisis, as predicted by portfolio theory. In contrast, we expect a negative relationship between the excess correlation component and bank performance, as systemic banks should have su¤ered more in the crisis.
Speci…cally, we estimate the following model:
where Table 4 shows the results from various models. 21 The model in column (1) Column (2) shows next the results when we include the ratio of real estate loans 20 The starting point is motivated by the fact that the banking sector price index had already began to decline in the …rst half of 2007. 21 Since the focus in this table is on whether the interbank correlation measures explain subprime performance over and above other variables, we subsequently enlarge the set of control variables as we progress (this is in contrast to Tables 2 and 3 where we include separate blocks of variables each time in order to mitigate potential problems arising from multicollinearity among the bank characteristics). over loans, loan risk controls, as well as the asset quality controls. The positive and signi…cant relationship for both correlation components remains, but the size of the e¤ect decreases somewhat for the diversi…cation part. As expected, real estate loans and higher loan growth prior to the crisis lead to lower performance in 2007-2009. In addition, higher pro…tability in 2006 is related to higher performance during this period.
This indicates that more pro…table banks are more resilient to downturns. Finally, the term capturing interest income from loans is negatively related to share performance during the crisis, which is in line with the poor performance of mortgage loans during the crisis.
Regression results when securitization controls are included are contained in column (3). The coe¢ cients for the main variables remain positive and signi…cant at the 1% and 5% level. Among the other variables included, the term for MBS held to maturity is signi…cant but only weakly so. In column (4) we add the derivatives controls.
The coe¢ cients of our variables of interest slightly decrease, but remain positive and signi…cant. The derivatives controls are both insigni…cant.
An explanation for the positive relationship between excess correlation and bank performance is bail-out expectations. If the market perceives bail-outs to be more likely for correlated banks due to a "too-many-to-fail"policy, this may lead to a higher share price performance for correlated banks relative to their peers. To investigate this possibility, we include a dummy variable which indicates whether a given bank received TARP aid during the sample period. The results of the model are shown in column (5). The estimates for both components remain signi…cant and positive. This potentially re ‡ects that bailouts (actual and expected) come in a variety of forms; the TARP dummy may only very imperfectly control for them. The coe¢ cient on the TARP dummy itself is negative and signi…cant at 5%. This is explained by fact that banks that received TARP are banks that were especially hit by the crisis and hence also had a poor share price performance.
We account for alternative controls of bank risk in two additional regressions. In column (6), we control for systematic risk by including share price betas estimated from 2006 data. The estimate for the beta is negative and not signi…cant. The coe¢ cients for correlation components remain signi…cant with the same sign. Finally, in column In sum, in this section we have found a positive relationship between bank diversi…c-ation (measured prior to the crisis) and bank performance during the crisis. In contrast,
we have not found a stable relationship between excess correlation and bank performance. The results suggest that it is important to separate out the di¤erent components of interbank correlation when evaluating the systemic vulnerability of a bank. While diversi…cation has the potential to increase resilience to crises, this is not the case for excess correlation.
Conclusion
Higher correlation across banks is typically taken to imply systemic risk. In particular, interbank correlations are often used as a direct proxy of systemic risk or enter systemic risk measures indirectly, such as through the covariance of bank returns and banking sector returns. In this paper we have argued that interbank correlations consist of two parts. One part is indeed due to systemic risk, but there is also a second one that arises due to diversi…cation activities. While banks that display high correlation in the …rst dimension should clearly alert regulators, this is not necessarily the case for banks that have high correlation in the second dimension.
We have proposed a way to conceptually disentangle both parts based on the minimum commonality induced by diversi…cation. An empirical application to U.S. BHCs has shown that variation in interbank correlations comes predominantly from the diversi…cation component; the importance of the systemic component is much smaller. In addition, banks that displayed high correlation due to diversi…cation performed better during the subprime crisis. Taken together, this sheds doubt on the appeal of using straight correlation measures as input into systemic risk assessments and suggests that regulators should take into account the di¤erent sources of bank correlation. The dependent variable is the correlation between the bank and S&P500 index returns. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signi…cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The dependent variable is the excess interbank correlation, measured as the residual of a cross section OLS regression of the interbank correlation on the correlation between the bank and S&P500 index returns. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signi…cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The dependent variable is the bank's share price performance over the period 2 January 2007 until 31 December 2009. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote signi…cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
